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Using detailed firm-level data covering 592 firms in the private sector in Tunisia covering the 
period 2009-2012, this paper (i) examines the relationship between firm characteristics and 
their perception of the effect of political instability on their business operations, and (ii) tests 
whether political instability has had a negative effect on firm performance. Using ordered and 
binary probit/logit models, we find that (i) larger-sized firms are more likely to report political 
instability as a sever obstacle to their operations. Using OLS and an endogenous treatment 
linear regression models, we find that (ii) the perception of political instability is negatively 
associated with firm performance, and after correcting for endogeneity it can even have a 
negative causal effect on firms’ sales and employment growth, all else held constant. Results 
are largely robust to different specifications.   
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Tunisia has completed a difficult political transition since December 2010. The Jasmine 
revolution was triggered in December 2010 by widespread protests against lack of voice and 
opportunity. Less than 6 years later, the country is now governed by a new constitution 
(January 2014), and has witnessed free and fair legislative (October 2014) and presidential 
(December 2014) elections. Recent political and economic developments led to the agreement 
of the “Pact of Carthage” in July 2016 and the formation of a new government of national unity 
in August 2016.   
 
Building on successful political progress, the Tunisian government is now in the midst of an 
ambitious economic transition. The Tunisian economic program  aims at achieving high and 
sustainable economic growth, with a high job-content, driven by a vibrant and competitive 
private sector. In this context, the government has the crucial role of creating a supportive and 
dynamic business environment, that fosters competition and transparency, for the private sector 
to be able to play its role as an engine for growth and make a sufficient dent in the country’s 
unemployment rate.  
 
Recently, the EBRD/EIB/WB conducted a joint MENA Enterprise Survey (MENA ES) to 
better understand the business environment in the Middle East and North Africa region.1 
Countries covered by the MENA ES included: Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Tunisia, the West Bank and Gaza and Yemen. The survey covered the period 2009-2012 and 
was conducted in 2013-2014 across countries of the region, covering issues such as firms’ 
experiences with a broad range of dimensions of the business environment in which they 
operate, as well as information on induvial firm characteristics. EBRD/EIB/WB (2016) 
summarizes the country responses, while EBRD/EIB/WB (2015) outlines the survey 
methodology. In this study, we focus on the responses of 592 private firms in the 
manufacturing and services sectors in Tunisia to be able to better understand the business 
environment in which they operate.  
 
In Tunisia, political instability has been overwhelmingly identified as the number one 
constraint to business by the surveyed firms. In the questionnaire, individual firms were asked 
to what degree do different business dimensions represent an obstacle to their operations. Out 
of a menu of options, around half of the interviewed firms cited political instability as the top 
obstacle to their business operations. This was followed, although to a lesser extent, by 
informality, an inadequately educated labor force, access to finance, and corruption.  
 
In this context, the objective of this study is twofold. First, is to examine the relationship 
between firm perception of the effect of political instability and firm characteristics. Second, 
                                                             
1 The full questionnaire, sampling methods, and data are accessible at http://ebrd-beeps.com/data/mena-es-
2013-2015/ 
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is to test whether political instability has had a negative effect on firm performance over the 
period under consideration. 
 
On the first objective, results suggest that export-oriented and smaller-sized firms are more 
likely to report political instability as a sever obstacle to their operations. Empirical results 
indicated that these firms are more likely to report political instability as a severer obstacle, as 
compared to domestic-oriented and larger-sized firms. This result holds under different 
econometric estimation techniques (ordered logit/probit vs binary logit/probit), as well as other 
robustness checks such as changing model specifications and inclusion of country fixed 
dummies.  
 
On the second objective of this study, results suggest that political instability can have a 
negative and statistically significant effect on firm performance. We use two econometric 
techniques that take into account the survey properties of the sample. We start by using OLS 
and find that perception of political instability is associated with lower firm performance, all 
else equal. We then use treatment effect models to obtain a causal interpretation of the results 
and correct for potential endogeneity. Specifically, using an endogenous treatment-regression 
model that allows the estimation of a linear regression which includes an endogenous binary 
treatment variable, we confirm our earlier findings and report a negative and statistically 
significant causal effect. Results hold against alternative specifications. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II gives an initial look at the data. 
Section III presents empirical methodology and results. Section IV concludes.  
 
II.   AN INITIAL LOOK AT THE DATA 
The MENA ES covers a representative sample of formal private sector firms in Tunisia. 
According to EBRD/EIB/WB (2015), private firms need to satisfy certain criteria to be 
included in the survey. Firms need to be formally registered, employ five or more employees,2 
and operate in the manufacturing or services sectors.3 Firms with 100 percent state ownership 
are excluded. Firms are chosen through a random sampling method, stratified by location, size 
and sector of activity. This led to a sample of 592 private firms in Tunisia, broken down as 
follows: Tunis (125 firms), South Coast/West (145), Sfax (126), Northeast (153), and Interior 









                                                             
2 Firm size is defined as small (5-19 employees), medium (20-99 employees), and large (more than 99 
employees).  
3 Agriculture, fishing and extractive industries, utilities and some services sectors, (such as financial services, 
education and healthcare) are not included in the survey. 























Obstacles to firms’ operations 
Political instability is reported as the top obstacle to firm operations in almost half of the 
surveyed firms. In the survey questionnaire, firms were asked What is the biggest obstacle 
affecting the operation of this establishment?4 Results suggest that almost 1 out of every 2 of 
the surveyed firms (48 percent) cited political instability as the top obstacle affecting their 
operations (Figure 2). Practices of competitors in the informal sector came in second place 
with 13 percent, followed by an inadequately educated labor force (10 percent), access to 
finance (10 percent), and corruption (4 percent). The choice of political instability as top 
obstacle is common for all cities/regions, ranging from a high of 61 percent in Tunis to a low 
of 36 in Sfax. Business obstacles, other than political instability, differed slightly across 














                                                             
4 This is question M.1. in the survey questionnaire. 







Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
(in percent, by city/region, 592 firms)
Figure 1: Distribution of firms



























Most surveyed firms also believe political instability is a “very severe obstacle” to their 
business operations. Focusing on political instability, the firms’ top choice as a business 
obstacle, firms were also asked: To what degree is political instability an obstacle to the 
current operations of this establishment?5 Around 34 percent of firms cited political instability 
as a “major obstacle”, followed by “very severe obstacle” by about 26 percent of firms (Figure 
3). This result holds at the regional level as well, except for the Northeast region where more 
firms cited political instability as a very sever obstacle (33 percent) rather than a major obstacle 













                                                             
5 This is question J.30e in the survey questionnaire. 
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Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
(in percent, 592 private firms)
Figure 2: Top Obstacles to Firm
Operations in Tunisia

























Firm characteristics  
Regarding the destination of firm sales, most are directed toward the local market. Firms were 
asked What percentage of this establishment’s sales were national sales? Indirect exports? 
Direct exports?6 Results, by region, are presented in Figures 4 and 5. One can see that most 
sales are directed toward the domestic market, especially in Tunis (around 85 percent), whereas 
this percentage is smallest in the Interior region (79 percent).  On average for Tunisia, 80 
percent of sales are directed toward the local market. Focusing on firms where direct exports 
represent 10 percent or more of their total sales (Figure 5), we find that Tunis has the lowest 
average (24 percent), while the Interior region has the highest (40 percent). The average for 












                                                             
6 This is question D.3. in the survey questionnaire. 







Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
(in percent, 592 private firms)
Figure 3: To what degree is political instability
an obstacle to firm operations?







Regarding the structure of firm ownership, the vast majority of surveyed firms are domestically 
owned. In the survey questionnaire, firms were asked What percentage of this firm is owned 
by private domestic? Private foreign? Government/state? Other?7 Results suggest that the vast 
majority of firms are domestically owned, reaching a high of 99 percent of surveyed firms in 

















                                                             
7 This is question B.2. in the survey questionnaire. 






Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
Note: Indirect exports are domstic sales to third parties that export
(percentage, average per city/region)
Figure 4: Destination of firm's sales
Domestic Indirect exports
Direct exports







Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
Note: Values take 1 if exports are 10 percent or more, and zero otherwise.
Values report the average of this series.
(fraction, average per city/region)
Figure 5: Exports 10% or more of sales?
























Regarding firm age, the average Tunisian firm surveyed has around 21 years of operations. 
Firms were asked: In what year did this establishment begin operations?8 On average for 
Tunisian firms, a typical firm reported around 21 years of operations, ranging from an average 
low of 17 years in the Interior region to a high of 23 years in Tunis (Figure 7). Focusing on 
young firms with 5 years or less of operations, survey results suggest that these are mostly 
concentrated in the Northeast region and Tunis (Figure 8).   
 
                                                             
8 This is question B.5. in the survey questionnaire. 






Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
(percentage, average per city/region)
Figure 6: Firm ownership structure
Private domestic Private foreign
Government/State Other




Regarding firm size, most interviewed firms are small or medium-sized. In the survey 
questionnaire, firms were asked: What is the firm’s size?9  Firms could choose between “small 
or medium” or “large”. On average for the whole sample, around 92 percent of firms reported 
small or medium, while the remaining 8 percent reported large (Figure 9). In Tunis, the capital 






















                                                             
9 This is question A.6 in the survey questionnaire. Firm size is defined as small or medium (5-99 employees) or 
large (more than 100 employees) 







Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
(years, average per city/region)
Figure 7: Firm years in operation







Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
Note: Values take 1 if firm has been in operation for 5 years or less, and zero otherwise.
Values report the average of this series.
(fraction, average per city/region)
























Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
Firm size is defined as small or medium (5-99 employees), and large (more than 100 employees)
(in fraction)
Figure 9: Firm size





Performance, in terms of sales and employment growth over 2009-2012, varied across 
surveyed firms. In the survey questionnaire, firms were asked the following question on the 
value of their sales: What were the establishment’s total annual sales last fiscal year (2012)?10 
And 3 fiscal years ago (2009)?11 Results are presented in Figure 10. They were also asked the 
following question on the number of their employees: Number of permanent full time 
employees at end of last fiscal year (2012)?12 At end of 3 fiscal years ago (2009)?13 Results 
are reported in Figure 11. The Interior region reported the worst performance, both in terms of 
sales growth (-19 percent) and employment growth (-5 percent) over the 2009-2012 period. 
All other regions reported positive growth in both dimensions, although South Coast/West and 
Tunis fared slightly worse than Sfax and Northeast regions. For the country as a whole, sales 









                                                             
10 This is question D.2. in the survey questionnaire. 
11 This is question N.3. in the survey questionnaire. 
12 This is question L.1. in the survey questionnaire. 
13 This is question L.2. in the survey questionnaire. 
14 Sales and employment growth variables in what follows removes outliers in the top and bottom 2.5 
percentiles. of EBRD/EIB/WB (2016) follow a similar idea on their estimations for the MENA countries. 







Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
Note: Outliers in the top and bottom 2.5 pecentiles are removed
(average per city/region)
Figure 10: Sales Growth







Source: Author's calculations based on MENA ES
Note: Outliers in the top and bottom 2.5 pecentiles are removed
(average per city/region)
Figure 11: Employment Growth
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III.   EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
A.   Political Instability and Firm Characteristics  
In this section, we estimate both an ordered and a binary logit/probit model to study the 
determinants of the severity of political instability as a business obstacle. Firms were asked: 
To what degree is political instability an obstacle to their current operations? Responses 
ranged from “No obstacle” (taking a value of 0) to “Very severe obstacle” (a value of 4). In 
what follows, the dependent variable is responses to the question as in the following 
specification:  
 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡) 
 
 
where the dependent variable Political instabilityist of firm i in sector s at time t is a function 
of Xist a set of control variables representing firm characteristics. The variable of interest 
Political instabilityist would range from 0 to 4 in the ordered logit/probit, while it would be a 
binary 0 1 dummy variable in the binary logit/probit as explained below. 
   
The Ordered Logit/Probit Evidence 
We start with an ordered logit/probit model to estimate the relationship between political 
instability, the major constraint to business in Tunisia, and firm characteristics. The dependent 
variable in the ordered logit/probit is the ordinal responses to the above question15, and 
independent variables are firm characteristics such as firm age, export status, size, ownership 
structure, and manager experience and education levels.16 Estimation of the ordered logit 
(models (1) and (2)) and the ordered probit (models (3) and (4)) model parameters for survey 















                                                             
15 An ordinal variable is a variable that is categorical and ordered. 
16 This follows a specification similar to that of EBRD/EIB/WB (2016) for all MENA countries. 
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Table 1: Ordered Logit/Probit  









     
Life of firm, in years 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) 
Young firm (Y/N) -0.000 0.015 0.049 0.040 
 (0.432) (0.424) (0.235) (0.231) 
Foreign ownership (Y/N) 0.505 0.457 0.197 0.136 
 (0.637) (0.682) (0.339) (0.357) 
Exports more than 10% of sales (Y/N) 0.470* 0.461* 0.260* 0.247* 
 (0.242) (0.252) (0.141) (0.144) 
Size 0.645** 0.730*** 0.367** 0.417*** 
 (0.257) (0.277) (0.150) (0.157) 
Firm part of larger firm (Y/N) 0.189 -0.046 0.125 0.007 
 (0.491) (0.498) (0.281) (0.271) 
Manager experience, in years -0.022* -0.017 -0.013* -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) 
Manager education level  -0.053 -0.022 -0.049 -0.030 
 (0.204) (0.206) (0.114) (0.115) 
     
Observations 588 588 588 588 
City/Region FE No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation is done using survey weights. Constant and dummies not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Export-oriented and smaller firms are more likely to report political instability as a severer 
obstacle. Coefficients attached to firms with exports representing 10 percent or more of sales, 
and smaller-sized firms17 are positive and statistically significant. These results hold whether 
we include city/region fixed effects or no. Export-oriented firms, those where exports represent 
10 percent or more of their total sales, can be more vulnerable to instability leading to less 
efficient business procedures or increased red tape. Larger firms may be better equipped to 
withstand disturbances from political instability, and therefore could perceive political 
instability as not so severe a constraint compared to smaller firms. Results, in general, are 
similar if we use the ordered logit or the ordered probit, and are robust to alternate 
specifications.18 
 
The Binary Logit/Probit Evidence 
As a robustness check, we re-do the above exercise using a binary logit/probit model. 
Specifically, we suppress the dependent variable into a simpler binary 0 or 1 indicator. The 
                                                             
17 The size variable is defined as “large” taking a value of 3 or “small/medium” taking a value of 4. This is in 
response to question A.6 in the survey questionnaire. 
18 As robustness checks, we replace the 10 percent exports dummy (Y/N) with the ordered exports variable, as 
well as foreign ownership dummy (Y/N) with the ordered foreign ownership variable. Results are largely 
unchanged. 
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new dependent variable takes the value of 1 if responses are “major constraint” or “very severe 
constraint”, while it takes a value of 0 if the response is “no obstacle”, “minor obstacle” or 
“moderate obstacle”.19 20Results are reported in table (2). 
 
Table 2: Binary Probit/Logit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Logit Logit Probit Probit 
     
Life of firm, in years -0.010 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) 
Young firm (Y/N) -0.292 -0.312 -0.177 -0.188 
 (0.533) (0.541) (0.331) (0.333) 
Foreign ownership (Y/N) 0.105 0.043 0.053 0.016 
 (0.468) (0.493) (0.284) (0.295) 
Exports more than 10% of sales (Y/N) 0.565** 0.562** 0.346** 0.339** 
 (0.275) (0.278) (0.169) (0.168) 
Size 0.512* 0.599* 0.312* 0.363* 
 (0.296) (0.315) (0.182) (0.187) 
Firm part of larger firm (Y/N) 0.041 -0.137 0.019 -0.078 
 (0.455) (0.462) (0.284) (0.283) 
Manager experience, in years -0.015 -0.013 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
Manager education level  0.071 0.091 0.039 0.057 
 (0.221) (0.222) (0.134) (0.133) 
     
Observations 588 588 588 588 
City/Region FE No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation is done using survey weights. Constant and dummies not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Results using the binary logit/probit model are similar to those using the ordered logit/probit 
model.  Specifically, export-oriented and smaller firms are more likely to report political 
instability as a severer obstacle to their business operations. These results hold whether we 




                                                             
19 Kuntchev et al (2014) perform a similar analysis to study the relationship between access to finance in SMEs 
and firm characteristics in more than 100 countries. 
20 Results are largely similar if we define the new binary variable as taking the value of 1 if responses also 
include “moderate obstacle”, while taking the value of 0 for “no” and “minor” obstacles only. 
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B.   Political Instability and Firm Performance  
Does political instability affect firm performance? We answer this question using two 
econometric approaches; namely OLS and an endogenous treatment effects approach. In what 
follows, the dependent variable is firm performance as in the following specification:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 , 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
  
where the dependent variable Yist is a measure of firm performance (sales and employment 
growth between 2009-2012) of firm i in sector s at time t. Independent variables include Xist a 
set of control variables representing firm characteristics. Firms were asked: To what degree is 
political instability an obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?21 Our variable 
of interest Political instabilityist is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm 
believes political instability to be a constraint (responses “major” and “very severe” obstacle), 
and zero (responses “no”, “minor” and “moderate”) otherwise. This is the same binary 
indicator we used in the previous section in the probit/logit model. 
 
The OLS Regression 
The OLS model specifies measures of firm performance as a function of political instability 
and a set of controls representing firm characteristics. Results are in reported in Table (3), with 
the dependent variable being either sales growth or employment growth, with and without 























                                                             
21 This is question J.30e in the survey questionnaire. 




Table 3: OLS  
 Sales growth  Employment growth 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
      
Political Instability -0.221*** -0.189***  -0.092** -0.084* 
 (0.061) (0.061)  (0.042) (0.044) 
Life of firm, in years -0.002 -0.002  -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Young firm (Y/N) 0.001 0.017  0.156 0.143 
 (0.246) (0.250)  (0.284) (0.274) 
Foreign ownership (Y/N) -0.043 -0.035  -0.089 -0.084 
 (0.086) (0.087)  (0.073) (0.077) 
Exports more than 10% of sales (Y/N) 0.180** 0.184**  0.058 0.060 
 (0.076) (0.075)  (0.048) (0.048) 
Size -0.120 -0.132*  -0.143** -0.139** 
 (0.078) (0.077)  (0.066) (0.067) 
Firm part of larger firm (Y/N) 0.028 0.056  0.016 0.014 
 (0.057) (0.065)  (0.043) (0.046) 
Manager experience, in years -0.002 -0.002  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Manager education level  -0.029 -0.036  -0.026 -0.015 
 (0.052) (0.050)  (0.028) (0.030) 
      
Observations 515 515  532 532 
R-squared 0.080 0.103  0.084 0.101 
City/Region FE No Yes  No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation is done using survey weights. Constant and city dummies not 
reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Results suggest that political instability is negatively associated with firm performance. This 
is evident from the coefficient attached to the political instability dummy variable in all four 
equation reported in Table (3). Equations (1) and (2) show sales growth as the dependent 
variable, while equations (3) and (4) show employment growth as the dependent variable. This 
result holds whether we include country fixed dummies (equations 2 and 4) or no (equations 1 
and 3), and is robust to alternative specifications (where we replace the 10 percent exports 
dummy (Y/N) with the ordered exports variable, as well as foreign ownership dummy (Y/N) 
with the ordered foreign ownership variable).    
 
Better firm performance is associated with export-oriented, bigger and younger firms. Other 
results from Table (3) suggest that higher sales growth is associated with firms that are export-
oriented and bigger in size. Moreover, higher employment growth is associated with younger 
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and bigger firms. Other firm characteristics such as manager education22, manager experience, 
and ownership structure do not seem to be associated with better firm performance.  
 
The Endogenous Treatment Regression 
Correlation does not imply causation. Although the OLS results established a negative 
association between political instability and firm performance, this does not necessarily imply 
a causal effect of political instability as a business constraint on firm performance. Moreover, 
the perception of political instability can be endogenous to firm performance. As a result of 
this endogeneity problem, OLS estimates could suffer from a selection bias problem. We thus 
use an endogenous treatment-regression model that allows the estimation of a linear regression 
which includes an endogenous binary treatment variable. Put simply, the model – which 
originates from the program evaluation literature – stipulates that if an unobserved variable 
affects both the treatment and the outcome, then we have an endogeneity problem. In our 
context, our objective is to study the effect of political instability on firm performance. But 
suppose that a third variable (for instance, political connections) affects both the treatment 
(perception of political stability) and the outcome (firm performance), then we have an 
endogeneity problem.23  
 
Treatment-effects estimators extract experimental-style causal effects from observational data. 
In simple terms, the idea is that we want to create an experimental environment using non-
experimental data to be able to have a causal interpretation of the results. To do this in our 
context, each firm’s probability to receive a binary treatment is estimated (with a probit or 
logit) as a function of observables (firms’ characteristics). Firms with similar probabilities are 
matched. When firms have similar probabilities, their assignment to the treated group is largely 
random with respect to the relevant covariates, and thus mimics a controlled experiment, 
allowing identification of causal effects. Specifically, the estimator compares between treated 
(firms who perceive political instability as a business constraint) and control (firms who do not 
perceive political instability as a business constraint) units, and measures the average treatment 
effect on the outcome (firm performance), conditional on a set of observables (firm 
characteristics). 
 
Estimation is done by MLE. Heckman (1976, 1978) introduces the model, and Maddala (1983) 
derives the maximum likelihood (MLE) estimator. Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and 
Wooldridge (2010) later introduced the endogenous treatment-effects model. To the best of 
our knowledge, there exists no study that tests the causal effect of political instability on 
individual firm performance in Tunisia. A number of studies examine the correlation between 
firm performance and the business environment, especially in developing countries. For the 
MENA countries, Kinda (2015) uses panel methods to study how the investment climate is 
associated with firm technical efficiency in 22 countries. Using the World Bank Enterprise 
                                                             
22 The manager education level is in response to the question: What is the highest level of education completed by 
the Top Manager? This is question MNAB.7b. in the survey questionnaire. Responses range from “university 
degree or higher” with value 1 to “incomplete primary school” with value 5. Thus, higher values of this indicator 
indicate lower level of education. 
23 Similarly, suppose we wish to know the effect of a job training program on employment, and suppose that a 
third variable (for instance, motivation) affects both the treatment (participation in job program) and the outcome 
(employment). We have an endogeneity problem since we cannot observe motivation. 
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Survey (WBES) and a sample of MENA countries, Desai and Olofsgard (2011) present 
evidence that politically connected firms benefit from easier access to credit, while 
Bhattacharya and Wolde (2010) show that transport and customs constraints are associated 
with lower trade performance. 
 
Results are presented in table (4) for both sales and employment growth. In each of these 
regressions, models (1) does not include city fixed effects, while model (2) include them. 
 
Table 4: Endogenous Treatment Regression: Firm Performance 
 
 Sales growth Employment growth 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
VARIABLES MLE MLE MLE MLE 
     
Political Instability -0.151 -0.850*** -0.420*** -0.424*** 
 (0.179) (0.171) (0.110) (0.111) 
Life of firm, in years -0.002 -0.004 -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Young firm (Y/N) 0.018 -0.143 0.085 0.078 
 (0.244) (0.317) (0.270) (0.263) 
Foreign ownership (Y/N) -0.042 -0.048 -0.092 -0.091 
 (0.082) (0.141) (0.075) (0.077) 
Exports more than 10% of sales (Y/N) 0.169** 0.283*** 0.034 0.036 
 (0.080) (0.082) (0.046) (0.044) 
Size -0.125 -0.091 -0.123** -0.113* 
 (0.079) (0.086) (0.060) (0.058) 
Firm part of larger firm (Y/N) 0.033 0.010 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.058) (0.090) (0.061) (0.064) 
Manager experience, in years -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Manager education level  -0.030 -0.024 -0.012 -0.000 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.034) (0.038) 
     
Observations 544 544 542 542 
rho -0.089 0.717 0.224 0.237 
LR test for independent equations 244.52*** 1023.57*** 25.41*** 226.50*** 
Log likelihood -5919.005 -5887.1335 -534.88225 -506.09348 
AIC 11878.01 11856.27 1107.765 1058.187 
BIC 12002.58 12111.63 1189.375 1156.978 
City/Region FE NO YES NO YES 
Estimation is done using survey weights. Constant and city dummies not reported.  
Survey weights are not used to estimate the LR test for independent equations, Akaike’s Information Criteria 
(AIC) and Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
MLE: Estimator using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, with linearized standard errors in parentheses. 
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Regarding the sales growth equation, results suggest that political instability has a negative 
causal effect. In models (1) and (2), and focusing on the variable of interest, we find that the 
coefficient attached to political instability is negative and statistically significant. This gives 
us confidence in interpreting the results as casual effects, after controlling for endogeneity. 
Moreover, results of other coefficients from Table (3) using OLS are very similar to those of 
Table (4) using the endogenous treatment model. 
 
Endogeneity has effects on the estimation. In the MLE models, the likelihood-ratio test (LR 
test for independent equations) indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the treatment-assignment and outcome errors. Furthermore, in model (2) for example, 
the estimated correlation between the treatment-assignment errors and the outcome errors, ρ, 
is 0.717, indicating that unobservables that raise firm performance tend to occur with 
unobservables that raise the perception of effect of political instability on firm operations. 
Model (2) is our preferred model as it has a lower -LogLikelihood and a lower AIC, although 
model (1) has a lower BIC.  
 
Regarding the employment growth equation, results suggest that political instability also has a 
negative and statistically significant causal effect. The coefficient attached to the variable of 
interest is negative and significant in models (3) and (4), although model (4) is our preferred 
model as it has a lower -LogLikelihood, AIC, and BIC. Moreover, correcting for the 
endogeneity problem does not change our earlier OLS results, as other variables representing 
firm characteristics retain their sign and statistical significate.  
 
Overall, one can conclude that firms’ perception of political instability has had a negative and 
statistically significant effect on firm performance (sales and employment growth) in Tunisia. 
Using OLS regressions, empirical results suggest a negative and statistically significant 
association between the variables of interest, while using an endogenous treatment regression 
model, we find a negative causal effect on firm performance. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed at understanding the relationship between firm perception of the effect of 
political instability on their operations and their characteristics and performance. Specifically, 
using firm-level data from an EBRD/EIB/WB joint survey, conducted in 2013-2014 and 
covering the period 2009-2012, and covering 592 private firms in Tunisia, we (i) examine the 
relationship between different firm characteristics and their perception of the effect of political 
instability on their operations, and (ii) test whether political instability has had a negative effect 
on firm performance; namely the firms’ sales and employment growth. 
 
On firm characteristics, results suggest that export-oriented and smaller-sized firms are more 
likely to report political instability as a sever obstacle. Results indicated that these firms are 
more likely to report political instability as a severer obstacle, as compared to domestic-
oriented and larger-sized firms. This result holds under different robustness checks.  
 
On firm performance, results suggest that political instability can have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on firm sales and employment growth. Using OLS regressions, 
we find that the firm’s perception of political instability has been associated with lower firm 
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sales and employment growth. Moreover, results suggest that better firm performance is 
associated with certain firm characteristics such as export-orientation and firm age. Correcting 
for endogeneity, we use an endogenous treatment effect model and find that political instability 





Bhattacharya, Rina and Hirut Wolde (2010) “Constraints on Trade in the MENA Region”, IMF 
WP 10/31. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Cameron, A. C., and P. K. Trivedi (2005) “Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications”, New 
York: Cambridge: University Press. 
 
Desai, Raj, and Anders Olofsgard (2011) “The Costs of Political Influence: Firm-level Evidence 
from Developing Countries”, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 6: pp. 137-178. 
 
EBRD/EIB/WB (2016) “What’s Holding Back the Private Sector in MENA? Lessons from the 
Enterprise Survey”, A joint report by The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the World Bank Group 
(WBG). 
 
EBRD/EIB/WB (2015) “The MENA Enterprise Surveys (MENA ES): A Report on Methodology 
and Observations”, A joint report by The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the World Bank Group 
(WBG). 
 
Heckman, J. (1976) “The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample 
Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models”, 
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5: pp. 475–492. 
 
Heckman, J. (1978) “Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System” 
Econometrica 46: 931–959.  
 
Kinda, Tidiane, Patrick Plane, and Marie-Ange Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2015) “Does Investment 
Climate Matter for Firms’ Technical Efficiency: An Application to Middle Eastern and 
North African Manufacturing”, Journal of International Development 27 (7): pp. 1267-93. 
 
Maddala, G. S. (1983) “Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics”, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010) “Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data”, 2nd ed. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
